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Abstract
When participants are presented simultaneously with spoken language and a visual display
depicting objects to which that language refers, participants spontaneously fixate the visual referents
of the words being heard [Cooper, R. M. (1974). The control of eye fixation by the meaning of
spoken language: A new methodology for the real-time investigation of speech perception, memory,
and language processing. Cognitive Psychology, 6(1), 84–107; Tanenhaus, M. K., Spivey-Knowlton,
M. J., Eberhard, K. M., & Sedivy, J. C. (1995). Integration of visual and linguistic information in
spoken language comprehension. Science, 268(5217), 1632–1634]. We demonstrate here that such
spontaneous fixation can be driven by partial semantic overlap between a word and a visual object.
Participants heard the word ‘piano’ when (a) a piano was depicted amongst unrelated distractors;
(b) a trumpet was depicted amongst those same distractors; and (c), both the piano and trumpet
were depicted. The probability of fixating the piano and the trumpet in the first two conditions rose as
the word ‘piano’ unfolded. In the final condition, only fixations to the piano rose, although the
trumpet was fixated more than the distractors. We conclude that eye movements are driven by the
degree of match, along various dimensions that go beyond simple visual form, between a word and
the mental representations of objects in the concurrent visual field.
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Cooper (1974) first demonstrated that eye movements are directed towards the objects to
which individual words refer in an accompanying visual display, even as those words unfold
in time; participants were more likely to fixate a picture of a dog when hearing part or all of
the word ‘dog’ than to fixate unrelated pictures. Whilst this observation has received
considerable attention in recent years (e.g. Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus 1998;
Dahan, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus et al., 2001), there is a second observation which has not:
Cooper also observed that participants were more likely to fixate a picture showing a
sailboat when hearing the semantically related word ‘lake’, and that 53% of these looks were
initiated during the word itself (57% of looks to the dog were initiated during ‘dog’). Yee
and Sedivy (2001) observed an ostensibly similar effect when they found increased looks
towards a key when the word ‘lock’ was heard (a lock and a key were visually co-present).
Using a visual search paradigm, Moores, Laiti, and Chelazzi (2003; Experiment 5) found
more looks towards a lock than towards other objects when participants were given the
(visual) word ‘key’ as the search target. These observations suggest a visual equivalent of
semantic priming (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). However, it is unclear from these studies
whether these effects were driven by semantic relatedness or semantic association—in
Moores et al. (2003), a variety of associative relationships were used; in Yee and Sedivy
(2001) the relationship was primarily functional; and in Cooper (1974), there were only four
visual scenes and semantic relatedness was not controlled. In the present study, we ask
whether ‘visual semantic priming’ holds across items that are semantically, but not
associatively, related. For example, will we observe increased looks towards an object (e.g.
a trumpet) that is related only by category to the target word (‘piano’)?
The present study addresses the basis on which eye movements can be directed, by
individual lexical items, towards objects in the visual field. One might suppose that visual
form is the primary basis for establishing the relationship between the word being heard
and what in the visual field that word refers to. However, the mental representation of an
object has much more in common with the information accessed on hearing a word than
just visual information alone; objects have ‘meaning’ independently of the language.
Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999), for example, found that very brief (17 ms) exposure to
pictures of objects caused activation of (gross) semantic category information. In which
case, and on the assumption that participants map language onto a mental representation of
the concurrent scene rather than onto the scene itself (cf. Altmann, 2004), the
representations of concurrent objects could be accessed on the basis of semantic category
information as well as on the basis of other types of information such as visual form,
colour, and so on. In the study below, we test this directly.2. Method
2.1. Subjects
Sixty native speakers of English from the University of York student community took
part in this study.
Fig. 1. The three versions of the scene shown here correspond, left to right, to the ‘target’ condition, the
‘competitor’ condition, and the ‘target & competitor’ condition, respectively. In each case, the target word was
‘piano’. Across the other scenes, the positioning of target and competitor was random.
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Thirty experimental scenes (see Fig. 1) were each paired with a sentence such as
‘Eventually, the man agreed hesitantly, but then he looked at the piano and appreciated
that it was beautiful’. There were three versions of each display: The ‘target’ version
contained the target object (referred to by the target word, underlined in the above
example) and three unrelated distractors; the ‘competitor’ version contained a competitor
object (drawn from the same conceptual category as the target object) and the same
distractors; the ‘target & competitor’ condition contained both the target and the
competitor objects, and two of the other distractors.
Each picture comprising a scene occupied a distinct quadrant of the display, and was a
black and white line drawing taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). Target/
competitor pairs were matched for picture naming agreement, familiarity, image
agreement, visual complexity, and frequency (of the corresponding name). All four
pictures within a display were drawn from different conceptual categories, as determined
by the Battig and Montague (1969) category norms. None of the conceptual competitors
were associates of the target words: We rejected any pairs from the Nelson word
association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) for which even a single
participant in those norms produced the competitor after the target, or vice versa. The 30
target-competitor pairs are given in Table 1.
Three lists of stimuli were constructed such that each participant saw 10 scenes in each
of the three conditions, but saw no scene more than once. We included an additional 15
filler items all of which contained an object that matched a word in the accompanying
sentence. Thus, of the 45 items, only 10 contained no object that directly matched a word
in the accompanying sentence.
The sentences were recorded at a normal speaking rate by a male native speaker of
British English (GTMA), and sampled at 44.1 kHz. The scenes were presented on a 17 00
viewing monitor at a resolution of 640!480 pixels.
2.3. Procedure
Participants were seated with their eyes between 20 00 and 25 00 from the display.
They wore an SMI EyeLink head-mounted eye-tracker, sampling at 250 Hz.
Table 1
Target/competitor pairs
Target Competitor Conceptual similarity Visual similarity
accordion Flute 0.53 0.02
axe Screwdriver 0.30 0.30
balloon Doll 0.03 0.08
bee Spider 0.37
butterfly Ant 0.27 0.28
celery Potato 0.33 0.08
chicken Penguin 0.38 0.27
cup Knife 0.13 0.03
desk Bed 0.03 0.35
fork Toaster 0.04 0.06
glove Tie 0.04 0.04
grapes Melon 0.02
jacket Shoe 0.12 0.03
kettle Pan 0.23 0.28
motorbike Helicopter 0.13 0.12
mushroom Peanut 0.19
nose Leg 0.22
ostrich Eagle 0.41 0.22
peacock Owl 0.46 0.11
pear Orange 0.43 0.33
piano Trumpet 0.24 0.03
pliers Chisel 0.57 0.25
rabbit Pig 0.24 0.18
saw Ladder 0.26
shirt Hat 0.06
skirt Waistcoat 0.16 0.29
spanner Ruler 0.00 0.25
train Bicycle 0.19 0.15
trousers Coat 0.33 0.22
violin Drum 0.28 0.05
For both conceptual and visual similarity, higher numbers indicate greater similarity.
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at whatever they wanted. Participants were not asked to perform any explicit task (cf. see
Altmann, 2004; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003, for discussion). Between each trial,
participants were shown a single centrally-located fixation dot which they were asked to
fixate prior to a fixation cross appearing in this position (this allowed for drift-correction of
the eye-tracker). Participants would then press a response button for the next presentation.
There was a 1s preview of the display before onset of the spoken sentence, and the target
word (e.g. ‘piano’) occurred on average 4 s after this onset.
The trial was automatically terminated after 9 s, which typically left 2 s after the end of
each sentence. The eye-tracker was recalibrated every four trials, using a 9-point fixation
stimulus; this typically took about 20 s. The entire experiment lasted approximately
twenty minutes. There were four practice trials.
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The change as the target word unfolded in time in the proportion of trials on which
the target, competitor, or distractors, were fixated is shown in Fig. 2. Given the 200 ms.Fig. 2. Proportion of trials with a fixation on the target, category competitor, or (averaged) distractor. The curves
are synchronised to the acoustic onset of the target word, and the x-axis shows time in milliseconds from this
onset. The panels show, from top to bottom, the ‘target’, ‘competitor’, and ‘target & competitor’ conditions,
respectively. The calculation excluded all movements prior to the acoustic onset, and thus negative values reflect
moves away from objects that were already fixated at this onset; in effect, each data point reflects the proportion of
trials with a fixation at that moment in time minus the proportion of trials with a fixation at the acoustic onset of
the target word.
Table 2
The probability of fixating each object in the three conditions at the onset of the target word, and the probability of
launching a saccade towards each object during the target word
Condition Object Fixations at onset Saccades from onset to offset
Target Target 0.23 0.39
Distractor 0.25 0.14
Competitor Competitor 0.25 0.36
Distractor 0.25 0.18
Target & Competitor Target 0.21 0.41
Competitor 0.22 0.17
Distractor 0.27 0.09
The figures for the distractor represent the average of the individual probabilities for each of the three
distractors.
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Altmann & Kamide, 2004; Dahan, Magnuson, Tanenhaus, & Hogan, 2001; Matin,
Shao, & Boff, 1993; Saslow, 1967; for additional evidence), it is unsurprising that it
takes around that time before the curves begin to diverge systematically. Consequently,
we report and analyze our data from a time-window extending from 200 ms. beyond
acoustic onset to 200 ms. beyond acoustic offset. We refer to these positions as ‘onset’
and ‘offset’, respectively, reserving the terms ‘acoustic onset/offset’ to refer to the
actual onset/offset. Table 2 reports the probabilities of fixating the target object, the
competitor object, and the averaged distractor (i.e. averaging together the probabilities
of fixating each distractor) at the onset of the target word, and the probabilities of
initiating a saccade towards these objects during the lifetime of the target word.1
Inferential analyses were based on hierarchical log-linear models (see Scheepers, 2003,
for discussion). Participants and items were entered, separately, as factors in the
computation of partial association Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squares (LRCS). This enables the
generalizability of effects to be assessed across items and participants. Hierarchical log-
linear models are particularly suited to the analysis of situations in which frequency data in
one cell (e.g. looks to the distractors) are contingent on frequency data in another (e.g.
looks to the target or competitor). For the purposes of inferential analysis, distractors were
not averaged, but were entered separately, and labeled ‘1’ for the first distractor clockwise
from the target, ‘2’ for the second, and so on.
3.1. Fixations at the onset of the target word
In the ‘target’ condition, there were no differences in the probabilities of fixating any
of the four objects (target or three distractors) (LRCSZ5.7, dfZ3, PZ0.13) and
although this was consistent across participants (LRCSZ203.3, dfZ177, PZ0.09), it
was not consistent across items (LRCSZ164.1, dfZ87, P!0.0001), suggesting
(unsurprisingly) that there were some scenes for which a distractor was fixated more1 The saccadic measure is equivalent to computing the area under the fixation curves shown in Fig. 2 (see
Altmann & Kamide, 2004, for discussion).
F. Huettig, G.T.M. Altmann / Cognition 96 (2005) B23–B32 B29than the target, and others in which the target received more fixations than one or more
distractors.2 In the ‘competitor’ condition, there were again no differences in fixations
on the competitor or distractors (LRCSZ0.5, dfZ3, PZ0.93); this was neither
consistent across participants (LRCSZ219.0, dfZ177, PZ0.02) nor items (LRCSZ
152.6, dfZ87, P!0.0001), suggesting once more that there were certain scenes in
which the target received more fixations than one or more distractors and vice versa.
Similarly, some participants tended to fixate certain objects more than other participants
did. In neither condition, however, was there a consistent bias to favour one or other of
the objects in the display.
In the ‘target & competitor’ condition, there were, overall, differences in fixations on
the four objects (LRCSZ11.1, dfZ3, PZ0.01) and these were consistent
across participants (LRCSZ199.2, dfZ177, PZ0.12) but not items (LRCSZ126.5,
dfZ87, PZ0.004). Pairwise comparisons revealed that there were no differences in looks
towards the target or the competitor (LRCSZ0.10, dfZ1, PZ0.75), consistent by
participants (LRCSZ60.8, dfZ59, PZ0.41) and items (LRCSZ41.8, dfZ29, PZ0.06),
but that there were fewer looks to both target and competitor than to the distractors
(LRCSZ8.0, dfZ1, PZ0.005), although this was neither consistent by participants
(LRCSZ79.4, dfZ59, PZ0.04) nor items (LRCSZ57.8, dfZ29, PZ0.001). In
summary: in the ‘target’ and ‘competitor’ conditions, there were no consistent biases
favouring any of the four objects in the display; in the ‘target & competitor’ condition both
the target and competitor tended to be looked at less than either of the distractors, but the
magnitude of this effect was not consistent across items or participants.3.2. Saccades during the target word
In the ‘target’ condition, more saccades were directed towards the target than to the
distractors (d1: LRCSZ72.9, dfZ1, P!0.0001; d2: LRCSZ84.9, dfZ1, P!0.0001; d3:
LRCSZ76.8, dfZ1, P!0.0001). These effects were consistent across participants (for all
interactions, PO0.05), but in the cases of distractors 1 and 3, the magnitude of the effects
was not consistent across items (d1: LRCSZ44.1, dfZ29, P!0.04; d3: LRCSZ57.3,
dfZ29, PZ0.003). In the ‘competitor’ condition, more saccades were directed towards
the competitor than to the distractors (d1: LRCSZ29.2, dfZ1, P!0.0001; d2: LRCSZ
35.9, dfZ1, P!0.0001; d3: LRCSZ27.1, dfZ1, P!0.0001). These effects were
consistent across participants (for all interactions, PO0.10), but again, in the cases of2 Consistency across items or participants in the loglinear analysis was computed on the basis of the
interaction between Items and Object, or between Participants and Object, in the analyses of partial
association LRCSs. When there is no main effect of Object, such interactions indicate an effect in one
direction for some items or participants, and an effect in the opposite direction for others. Overall, the lack
of a main effect means that these opposing effects across Items or Participants cancel out. If there is a main
effect of Object, accompanied by such interactions, this would mean that the magnitude of the effect
differed across participants or items (with perhaps some showing an effect in one direction, and others
showing a smaller effect in the other—hence leading to an overall main effect—or a majority showing an
effect in one direction, and others showing smaller, or no effects). Thus the effect would generalize, but the
magnitude of the effect would not. A main effect of Object in the absence of any such interactions would
mean that the magnitude of the main effect was consistent.
F. Huettig, G.T.M. Altmann / Cognition 96 (2005) B23–B32B30distractors 1 and 3, the magnitude of the effects was not consistent across items (d1:
LRCSZ43.1, dfZ29, PZ0.05; d3: LRCSZ52.1, dfZ29, PZ0.005).3,4 Across the two
conditions, there were no more saccades towards the target than towards the competitor
LRCSZ1.1, dfZ1, PZ0.3), consistent by items (LRCSZ21.6, dfZ29, PZ0.84) but not
participants (LRCSZ78.8, dfZ59, PZ0.04), suggesting that some participants looked
more towards the target in the ‘target’ condition than towards the competitor in the
‘competitor’ condition, whilst other participants showed the reverse pattern.
In the ‘target & competitor’ condition, there were more looks towards the target object
than towards the competitor object (LRCSZ68.6, dfZ1, P!0.0001), consistent by
participants and items (for both interactions, PO0.3), and more looks towards
the competitor object than towards either of the two distractors (d1: LRCSZ14.7,
dfZ1, PZ0.0001; d2: LRCSZ10.1, dfZ1, P!0.002), consistent by participants and
items (for both interactions, both PO0.05). In summary, there were more looks towards
the target and competitor than towards the distractors in the ‘target’ and ‘competitor’
conditions respectively, and in the ‘target & competitor’ condition.4. Discussion
The fact that more looks were directed towards the trumpet upon hearing ‘piano’ than
towards any of the distractors suggests that hearing ‘piano’ activated semantic information
which overlapped with the semantic information encoded within the mental representation
of the concurrent trumpet. This overlap in turn caused activation of that representation,
and hence the eye movements towards the trumpet. When both a piano and trumpet were
co-present in the scene, more looks were directed towards the piano, causing there to be
more looks away from the other objects. However, there were fewer looks away from the
competitor trumpet than from the distractors; and although looks towards the trumpet
never rose in this condition (presumably because of competition with the target piano), it
was, nonetheless, ‘privileged’. Thus, whereas previous studies have shown how
combinatorial semantics can direct visual attention towards semantically relevant objects
in the visual environment (cf. Kamide et al., 2003), this study shows how lexical semantics
can direct visual attention towards semantically related objects in that environment.
Finally, in collaboration with Ken McRae, we computed the ‘conceptual similarity’
between each target and its conceptual competitor (see Cree & McRae, 2003, for
discussion of the relevant semantic feature norms). We also derived visual similarity
norms (asking 12 new participants to rate how similar the physical shape of the actual3 One possible explanation for the consistency of the data with respect to distractor 2 is that this distractor was
always diagonally opposite the target, suggesting that it attracted fewer looks than the distractors on the same
horizontal or vertical as the target.
4 Notwithstanding the overall small number of trials in which no word referred to an object in the scene (10/45),
it is conceivable that the increased looks to the competitor in the ‘competitor’ condition were due to participants
becoming increasingly aware of the relationship between target and competitor. However, there were no
significant differences in the proportions of trials with looks to the competitor as a function of first half vs. second
half of the trials, or between first third vs. last third of the experimental trials (all PO0.05).
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norms existed for both members of 24 of the 30 target-competitor pairs we used. For these
24 pairs, we found in the ‘competitor’ condition that conceptual similarity correlated
significantly both with the probability of launching a saccade towards the competitor
(within the time interval used for inferential analyses; rZ0.44, PZ0.03), and with the
time subsequently spent fixating that object (rZ0.60, P!0.002). Visual similarity did not
correlate significantly with either of these dependent measures. Thus, category member-
ship per se was not an all-or-none factor that determined eye movements towards the
conceptual competitor; we conclude, albeit tentatively, that the eye movements reflected
the graded conceptual similarity of the competitor object to the target concept indicated by
the unfolding word.
To conclude: Visual attention can be directed immediately, as a word unfolds, towards
conceptually related (but non-associated) objects, even if they mismatch on other
dimensions that would normally determine which objects in the scene were appropriate
referents for the unfolding word (e.g. shape, colour, conceptual detail, etc.; see Huettig &
Altmann, 2004, for the converse effect; in which looks were directed to visually related,
but semantically inappropriate, objects). The data suggest further that the increased
attention afforded to conceptually related items is proportional to the degree of conceptual
overlap. The data demonstrate that language-mediated eye movements are a sensitive
measure of overlap between the conceptual information conveyed by individual spoken
words and the conceptual knowledge associated with visual objects.Acknowledgements
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